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Real-time embedded systems for safety-critical applications have 
to introduce fault tolerance mechanisms in order to cope with 
hardware and software errors. Fault tolerance is usually applied 
by means of redundancy and diversity. Redundant hardware     
implies the establishment of a distributed system executing a set 
of fault tolerance strategies by software, and may also employ 
some form of diversity, by using different variants or versions for 
the same processing.  
This paper describes our approach to introduce fault tolerance in 
distributed embedded systems applications, using aspect-oriented 
programming (AOP).  A real-time operating system sup-porting 
middleware thread communication was integrated to a fault 
tolerant framework. The introduction of fault tolerance in the 
system is performed by AOP at the application thread level. The 
advantages of this approach include higher modularization, less 
efforts for legacy systems evolution and better configurability for 
testing and product line development.   This work has been tested 
and evaluated successfully in several fault tolerant configurations 
and presented no significant performance or memory footprint 
costs.  
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
D.2.3 [Software Engineering]: Coding Tools and Techniques; 
D.4.7 [Operating Systems]: Organization and Design – Real-
Time Systems and Embedded Systems. 
Keywords 
Aspect-oriented programming, fault tolerance. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Embedded systems have a widespread use in several domains of 
safety-critical applications, as process control, avionics, space and 
medical systems.  These systems usually must satisfy real-time 
performance requirements, and so the correct response depends 
also on the time which it is produced. Generally a real-time 
system executes a series of tasks subjected to deadlines and jitter 
constraints. For many of these applications, there are serious 
constraints in physical size and energy consumption, which imply 
in reduced processing power and memory size.  Furthermore, 
these systems must exhibit high dependability [5], a concept that 
involves not only reliability, but also other attributes as 
availability, safety and maintainability.  
The means of achieving dependability include fault prevention 
and fault removal techniques, but usually fault tolerance (FT) 
techniques are needed to cover transient faults, hardware 
permanent faults and residual software faults. The application of 
fault tolerance techniques is rather difficult. Redundant hardware 
involves extra software coordination, which makes the software 
system more complex and prone to errors. 
The contribution of this work is evaluating the application of 
aspect-oriented techniques to the development of real-time em-
bedded fault-tolerant software. In contrast with previous works, 
we studied the usage of AOP at the application thread level, based 
on a thread model commonly used for embedded systems soft-
ware development.  We considered in this work a small real time 
operating system named BOSS, and a fault tolerance framework 
that supports several FT mechanisms, both for hardware and 
software faults. The proposed solution was evaluated qualitatively 
and quantitatively in terms of performance and memory footprint 
in relation to non-AOP implementations. In addition, a case study 
for testing this approach is described. 
2. FAULT TOLERANCE CONCEPTS 
A fault is active when it produces an error in the system state. An 
error may propagate and lead to a subsequent service failure. 
Fault tolerance is a means of achieving a continuous system ser-
vice in the presence of active faults [5]. Several FT strategies 
have been proposed and applied in the last 30 years. Some 
strategies are based on single version software, and can only be 
effective with hardware faults and transient software faults. One 
example is Rollback/Retry, also called “checkpoint and restart” 
[16]. In this strategy the detection of an error triggers a system 
rollback to a previously saved state and a re-execution of the same 
processing. This technique is based on backward error recovery 
and needs an efficient error detection mechanism. Other strategies 
apply hardware redundancy to detect and mask errors, as Triple 
Modular Redundancy (TMR) [18], where error detection is 
performed by comparison of the results of multiple hard-
ware/software units. 
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In order to deal with permanent software faults, multiple version 
software (software diversity) is needed. Several strategies have 
been proposed as Recovery Blocks (RB) [17], Distributed 
Recovery Blocks (DRB) [10] and N-Version Programming (NVP) 
[6]. 
RB and DRB perform backward error recovery like Roll-
back/Retry, but use different software versions, or variants, in 
each execution block. The main difference between RB and DRB 
is the distributed nature of the latter, which allows concurrent 
execution of variants in two distinct nodes and coordination 
between them to define what node will send the final output. 
NVP is a FT strategy that uses forward error recovery in which 
multiple variants (at least 3) run sequentially or concurrently. A 
decision mechanism selects the correct response usually by 
majority voting. In a multi-computer system, each variant runs in 
a different node and the decision mechanism (voter) may be 
replicated too.  
In this work, RB, DRB and NVP strategies are supported, as well 
as single version techniques related to them, as Roll-back/Retry, 
Pair of Self-Checking Processors (PSP) [11] and TMR. 
3. BOSS OPERATING SYSTEM 
BOSS is a real-time operating system developed by FHG-FIRST. 
The BIRD (Bi-Spectral Infrared Detection) satellite [14], de-
signed for early detection of fires, uses BOSS as its multiple-
computer control operating system. BOSS has also been applied 
in several other projects, and future utilizations include CubeSat 
satellites [15] and robotics in space [13]. 
BOSS design has been driven by reducing software complexity as 
a means to achieving dependability, as complexity is the cause of 
most development faults. The system had several parts validated 
by formal verification. It was developed using object-oriented 
programming with C++ and it has been ported to several 
platforms as PowerPC, x86 and Atmel AVR. There is also avail-
able an on-top-of Linux porting, primarily used for early testing.  
BOSS supports fault tolerance in hardware redundant systems, by 
including a middleware layer which carries out transparent 
communications between nodes, using the publisher-subscriber 
protocol. A message object can be sent locally to the network, 
using a string as message subject. Receiving messages must spec-
ify which subject they are expected to receive from. Threads are 
usually consumers of receiving messages, by attaching to mail 
box objects. The middleware also supports message marshaling 
and the elimination of duplicate messages, based on a message 
identification number. This work uses a middleware 
implementation based on broadcast communications but a unicast 
version is also available. 
4. FAULT TOLERANCE FRAMEWORK 
This Section describes our thread model, the basic features of the 
tolerance framework which was integrated to the BOSS operating 
system to support application level fault tolerance, and how this 
framework is applied. 
Fault tolerance can be applied to several layers of software, as at 
the operating system level, function/method level, object level or 
process level. Our work applies fault tolerance techniques to the 
thread level, but targeting only application threads, as operating 
system threads are supposed to be more robust 
Our purpose is presenting a general description of the framework 
fault tolerance capacities and how they are employed by the 
application programs. 
4.1 Thread Model 
Figure 1 shows the thread model required for fault-tolerant 
threads.  The thread to be made fault-tolerant runs in an infinite 
loop, reading from input devices or receiving input messages from 
other threads. After processing the inputs, an output is generated 
either by writing to an output device or sending a result message 
to other threads. The model supports both state threads and 
stateless threads. For state threads, the output result will depend 
both on the input data and on the previous state data. 
An example of a candidate thread for fault tolerance 
implementation is presented in Figure 2. 
 
class ExampleThread : public Thread { 
  
  Msg* recMsg; 
  Msg outMsg; 
  IncommingMessageAdministrator<Msg, 20>  
                            incommingMessages; 
public: 
  ExampleThread(){ ... // init code} 
    
  void run () { 
    while(1) { 
      recMsg = incommingMessages.receive(); 
      process(); 
      output(); 
    } 
  } 
 
  void process(){ 
    ... // uses msg data and state data 
  } 
 
  void output(){ 
    ... // prepares output message 
    outMsg.send("exampleResult"); 




Figure 2. Example of application thread. 
In BOSS, all application threads must inherit from the Thread 
class and implement the run virtual function, which defines the 
thread run-time behavior. In this example, ExampleThread runs 
cyclically, reading messages from an IncommingMessageAdmin-
istrator object, which consists of a mailbox for messages of the 
Figure 1. Model for FT threads.
Msg class. The process method is executed next, and implements 
some computing algorithm using data from the incoming message 
and possibly from an internal state. (attributes not shown). Finally 
the output method prepares the output message and sends it 
locally and over the network, using the string “exampleResult” as 
subject. The instantiation of thread objects is normally static, as 
shown in the last line of Figure 2. Dynamic memory allocation is 
avoided for performance reasons. 
4.2 Fault-Tolerant Application 
Figure 3 shows a class diagram of the FT framework. A fault- 
tolerant thread must define an FTStrategy object that will 
implement the fault-tolerant functionality.  Presently, three FT 
strategies have been implemented: RB, DRB and NVP, but others 
can be developed and integrated to the framework. Some 
strategies, like DRB, involve message exchanges and 
coordination between multiples nodes, for defining roles, 
initializing global state and communicating results. All this work 
is performed by the FT framework, but some specific procedures 
must be defined by the application, as for instance, the acceptance 
test in RB and DRB. The degree of transparency depends on the 
strategy selection and the configuration. The VoterThread class 
implements application dependent majority voting and it is used 
in NVP to select the correct response among the NVP threads. 
StdVoter is a specialized voter that performs exact majority 
voting. 
The modifications required to make an application thread fault-
tolerant include: 
•  Instantiation and registration of an FTStrategy object that 
will implement the desired fault tolerance strategy, as RB, 
DRB and NVP. 
•  Execution of the executeFT method of the FTStrategy 
object after the thread activation. 
•  Implementation of application specific methods related to 
the selected fault tolerance strategy (as the acceptance test 
in RB and DRB). Some of them consist of new functionality 
but others will contain the code originally defined in the 
processing and output methods. 
Figure 4 shows an example of fault tolerant implementation for 
ExampleThread, using the DRB strategy. The main differences 
between this version and the original code in Figure 2 are 
highlighted. A concrete FTStrategy is instantiated as a 
DRBStrategy (myDRB). In the class constructor, the maximum 
response time for execution is set to 20,000 microseconds and the 
setFTStrategy method is called, assigning the address of the 
DRBSstrategy to the ftStrategy pointer. In the run method, the 
original process and output methods are replaced by a call to the 
executeFT method of the FTStrategy class. This method is 
responsible for executing the particular strategy and for activating 
the application specific methods defined in the application thread, 
as for example, variant1 (primary block) and acceptanceTest. 
Some of these methods correspond to original implementations, 
but others, like variant2 (recovery block) and saveCheckpoint 
should be defined to allow the DRB strategy operation. 
In this example, ExampleThread is stateless; otherwise 
FTExampleThread should also implement the methods getState 
and setState, to provide state initialization between the primary 
and the shadow nodes in DRB. None of these methods are 
necessary in the original version, as only one ExampleThread 
instance runs in a single node. 
 
class FTExampleThread : public Thread { 
   
  DRBStrategy myDRB; 
  Msg* recMsg; 
  Msg outMsg; 
  IncommingMessageAdministrator<Msg, 20> 
                             incommingMessages; 
public: 
 
  FTExampleThread(){ 
    ... // init code 
    myDRB.setMaxResponseTime(20000);  
    setFTStrategy(&myDRB); 
  } 
 
  void run () { 
    while(1) { 
      recMsg = incommingMessages.receive(); 
      ftStrategy->executeFT();  
    } 
  } 
 
  void variant1(){ 
    ... // same code of original process method  
  } 
 
  void sendResult(){ 
    ... // same code of original output method 
  } 
  // to be defined 
  void variant2(){ ...} 
  void saveCheckpoint(){ ... } 
  void restoreCheckpoint(){...} 
  bool acceptanceTest(){...} 
}; 
Figure 4. Example of FT application thread. 
 
4.3 Application Specific Entities 
Each FT strategy instantiation and usage demands the definition 
of strategy attributes and application-specific behavior. These 
requirements are summarized in Tables 1 and 2. 
Table 1 represents requirements for multiple version software and 
Table 2 for single version software. The fault tolerance strategies 
in Table 2 use the same FTStrategy objects of RB, DRB and 
NVP, but do not implement their full functionality, as several 
methods are not defined and so they present a default 
implementation. For example, the default implementation save/ 
restoreCheckpoint is doing nothing and for acceptanceTest is 
returning true (success). 
Figure 3. Fault tolerance framework.
Table 1. Multiple version strategies requirements. 
 
Table 2. Single version strategies requirements. 
 
The simpler FT strategy in Table 2 is the restart strategy. In this 
technique only one variant is defined, and the acceptance test is 
not implemented. Therefore, the only possible error detection is 
deadline expiration. A deadline is obtained by adding the 
response time parameter to the thread activation time. Roll-
back/Retry can be implemented as a single version simplification 
of the RB strategy. In this case, only one real variant is defined, 
and the body of the variant2 should contain a call to the variant1 
method. In a similar way, PSP is implemented with the DRB 
strategy and TMR with the NVP strategy. 
Voter threads are needed when using TMR or NVP. In the general 
case, a voter thread is application-specific and must implement 
virtual methods defined in the VoterThread class (see Figure 3). 
For exact majority voting using messages, a standard voter which 
compares results byte by byte is provided (StdVoter class). It is 
also possible to define if all replicated voters will send their 
outputs or if only a master voter will do it. The definition of the 
master voter in a coordinated voting is performed by the FT 
framework. 
5. AOP IMPLEMENTATION 
Our goal is to use AOP to modularize all fault-tolerant code, 
keeping the original code intact. The process of generating the 
executable code using this approach is explained as follows. The 
operating system, already integrated to the fault tolerant frame-
work, is compiled and an OS library is generated. Abstract 
strategy aspects are developed for each FT strategy in the system. 
They define virtual pointcuts and standard advices used for all 
related concrete strategy aspects. A concrete aspect must be de-
fined for advising each future fault-tolerant application thread, as 
it will be discussed later. The weaving process using AspectC++ 
[4] generates a fault-tolerant application that is eventually com-
piled and linked to the OS code. 
 
aspect DRBStrategyAbstract { 
 
  pointcut virtual DRBClass() = 0; 
  pointcut virtual ProcessMethod() = 0; 
  pointcut virtual OutputMethod() = 0; 
  int maxResponseTime; 
 
  advice DRBClass(): slice class {   
    private: 
      DRBStrategy myDRB;             
  }; 
  pointcut constr() = construction(DRBClass()); 
 
  advice constr(): after(){ 
    tjp->target()->myDRB.setMaxResponseTime( maxResponseTime );  
    tjp->target()->setFTStrategy(&(tjp->target()->myDRB)); 
  } 
 
  pointcut compute()= call(ProcessMethod()) && target( DRBClass() ) && !within( "% ...::variant%(...)" 
);  
 
  advice compute(): around(){ 
    tjp->target()->ftStrategy->executeFT(); 
  }  
 
  pointcut result()= call(OutputMethod()) && target( DRBClass() ) && !within( "% ...::sendResult(...)" 
); 
 
  advice result(): around(){ 
  }  
}; 
Figure 5. DRB strategy abstract aspect. 
We will present an example of how to apply AOP to make the 
ExampleThread of Figure 2 fault tolerant, using the DRB strategy. 
Figure 5 shows the abstract aspect related to the DRB strategy. 
Initially this aspect declares three virtual pointcuts which will be 
defined in the concrete aspect. These pointcuts represent the 
thread class under modification (DRBClass) and the original 
methods for processing (ProcessMethod) and output 
(OutputMethod). The integer maxResponseTime will keep the 
maximum response time for execution, which must be defined by 
the concrete aspect. The introduction of the DRBStrategy object 
definition is carried out using the AspectC++ slice construction, 
which is used to extend the static structure of a program. The 
initialization of this object, as well as its registration, is performed 
by the advice with the constr pointcut, similarly as done in the 
constructor code of the non-AOP version in Figure 4. 
The compute pointcut defines a condition in which the processing 
method of the non-FT thread is called in the original code.  The 
around advice related to this pointcut will replace this call with 
the activation of the executeFT method of the FTStrategy class. 
Similarly, the result pointcut defines a condition in which the 
output method of the non-FT thread is called in the original code. 
The around advice related to this pointcut will just suppress this 
call, as the activation of the thread output is going to be con-
trolled by the FTStrategy object. 
The concrete aspect to make the ExampleThread fault-tolerant is 
shown in Figure 6. The aspect inherits from the 
DRBStrategyAbstract aspect and initially defines its virtual 
pointcuts. In this case, the target thread is “ExampleThread”, the 
processing method is “process” and the output method is 
“output”, as seen in Figure 2. 
 
aspect DRBExampleConcrete: public  
                         DRBStrategyAbstract { 
 
  pointcut DRBClass() = "ExampleThread"; 
  pointcut ProcessMethod()= "% ...::process()"; 
  pointcut OutputMethod() = "% ...::output()"; 
 
  DRBExampleConcrete(){ 
    maxResponseTime = 20000; 
  } 
 
  advice DRBClass() : slice class {   
    public: 
      void variant1(){ process(); } 
      void sendResult(){output(); } 
      
      // methods to be defined 
      void variant2(){ ... } 
      void saveCheckpoint(){ ... } 
      void restoreCheckpoint(){...} 
      bool acceptanceTest(){...} 
  } 
}; 
Figure 6. Concrete DRB aspect example. 
 
The maximum response time for this strategy is set to 20.000 
microseconds in the aspect constructor, by initializing a base 
abstract variable. After that, several methods are introduced in the 
target thread. The virtual method variant1 is responsible for 
running the primary block in DRB, and in this case it must 
execute the original processing of ExampleThread. Similarly, the 
virtual method sendResult must call the original output method. 
Here it should be noticed that the calls to process and output in 
the introduced methods variant1 and sendResult will not trigger 
the execution of the advices defined by the compute and result 
pointcuts in the DRBStrategyAbstract aspect, because the scope 
pointcut function within is being applied. Finally, the application 
specific methods are defined for this strategy, as variant2 
(recovery block) and saveCheckpoint. After the process of 
weaving, the new ExampleThread code becomes functionally 
equivalent as the non-AOP version of Figure 4. 
An alternative approach for code generation is applying aspects to 
connect the fault tolerance framework to the operating system. In 
this case, the weaving process now applies also to the original 
operating system code. The FT framework is injected in the OS 
by an aspect. In our framework this aspect has to modify the 
original Thread class to introduce a pointer to an FTStrategy 
object and the virtual functions shown in Tables 1 and 2. Using 
this approach it is possible to reduce the code size for non-FT 
implementations and also to apply aspects for fault tolerance and 
other concerns at the operating system level, as logging, 
synchronization and middleware customization [1]. However, 
there is no modification in abstract and concrete FT aspects used 
at the application level. 
6. EVALUATION 
In this Section we present two case studies. The first one was used 
to validate the AOP implementation by verifying if it produces 
the correct behavior. The second case study was meant to measure 
the AOP costs.  Finally, we discuss of advantages and 
disadvantages of the AOP approach. 
6.1 Radar Filtering System 
We applied the AOP approach to a radar filtering system. In this 
application a portable PC running an on-top-of Linux 
implementation of BOSS simulates a radar system and generates 
detection data of several planes periodically. The data generation 
includes simulated errors in bearing and distance, typical of this 
kind of equipment. This data is received by three PowerPC 823 
boards (80 MHz clock) running an application that filters the 
planes’ position, using an alpha-beta filter, and calculates the 
planes’ course and speed. The results are sent back to the portable 
PC, where they are displayed. Our development environment 
consisted of a PC host running Linux Fedora 3, GNU gcc 3.2.3 as 
cross-compiler and AspectC++ 1.0pre3 as aspect weaver [4]. 
Initially we had a single node, non-FT version of the filtering 
application, and then we applied AOP to create an FT application 
using TMR. The FT configuration is shown in the UML 
deployment diagram of Figure 7, where nodes are represented by 
cubes and application threads by rectangles. All Filter threads 
send their results with “unvoted_data” as subject, which are 
received by voter threads in the PowerPC boards. In this 
particular configuration, only the master voter thread sends the 
final results to the Display thread in the PC.  
The AOP implementation was compared to a non-AOP 
implementation and presented the correct behavior (timing and 
values) at all times. 
6.2 Performance and Memory Footprint 
We now describe an experiment to test and compare performance 
and footprint of the fault tolerant AOP implementations with 
respect to non-AOP implementations. 
In order to evaluate performance, we decided to measure the CPU 
utilization on the target board, in a test case with 10 RB threads 
with small processing times and high activation frequencies. A 
single processor configuration using only local messages was 
selected, aiming to eliminate the amount of CPU time spent on 
sending and receiving messages over the communication net-
work, which in our case is not affected by the usage of aspect-
oriented artifacts. 
A PowerPC 823 board executes an application with one Sender 
thread, which periodically generates an array of 5 integer random 
numbers and sends them using a local message. Then, the 10 
identical Receiver threads obtain this message and sort the 
numbers using the insertion sort algorithm as the primary block 
and the selection sort algorithm as the recovery block. The 
acceptance test is executed by checking if the integers are in the 
correct order within the result array. The Receiver threads output 
consists of preparing an output message with the sorting results 
but this message is not sent so as to decrease the CPU utilization. 
In this experiment three different software versions were 
evaluated: 
•  Non-FT implementation – In this version, the Receiver 
thread does not use any FT strategy and just sorts the arrays 
of integers with the insertion sort algorithm. The Receiver 
thread code is similar to the one presented in Figure 2. 
•  FT implementation – This version uses a Receiver thread 
that follows a standard object-oriented RB fault tolerance 
implementation, similar to the one presented in Figure 4. 
•  FT-AOP implementation – In this version the Receiver 
thread is the same of the non-FT implementation and the 
RB fault tolerance in injected by AOP, as described in 
Section 5. 
Figures 8 and 9 show performance results of these three 
implementations for different compiler optimizations and thread 
activation periods.  Figure 8 shows CPU utilizations with no 
compiler optimization (-O0 option in gcc) for activation periods 
of 5 and 10 milliseconds. The non-FT implementation has the 
lower CPU utilization as expected, because it does not involve 
any fault tolerant control and fault detection mechanisms, as the 
acceptance test in RB. Comparing fault tolerant implementations, 
we verified that, in this test case, the AOP version has a higher 
CPU utilization of about 6%, for un-optimized programs. On the 
other hand, if maximum performance optimization is performed 
by the compiler (-O3 in gcc), as shown in Figure 9, this difference 
in performance drops to less than 0.5%. That performance 
difference is directly dependent on the application thread 
activation. Consequently, we conclude that the performance 
difference measured in this experiment is greater than in real 
applications, as they usually have longer processing times and 
larger activation periods. 
Table 3 shows program memory sizes in bytes used for code 
(text), data and uninitialized data (bss) for each implementation, 
considering -O3 compiler optimization. The FT-AOP 
implementation uses more 260 bytes for code and 16 bytes for 
bss, comparing to the normal FT implementation. The increase in 
code size is caused by inlining after and around advices that make 
use of the AspectC++ joinpoint data structure. The extra bytes in 
bss are related to the creation of aspect objects and pointers. 
 
Table 3. Memory footprint results. 
 
version text data bss total 
Non-FT 65,987 6,384 207,152 279,523 
FT 66,783 6,424 207,792 280,999 
FT-AOP 67,043 6,424 207,808 281,275 
 
Figure 7. TMR strategy configuration.
Figure 8. CPU utilization with no optimization.
Figure 9. CPU utilization with maximum optimization.
Based on this experiment we conclude that the utilization of AOP 
for application-level fault tolerance implementation in an 
embedded real-time application does not imply a significant in-
crease in run-time or memory footprint. 
6.3 Discussion 
We used AOP to modularize all fault tolerant code at the 
application thread level, keeping the original code intact. The 
advantages of this approach are: 
•  Less prone to errors in porting a non-FT system to a FT one. 
The task of changing an existing system to introduce fault 
tolerance capabilities may insert software faults in the 
original code. Using AOP the original code is preserved. 
•  The programmer can initially write applications without 
fault tolerance in mind, and concentrate his efforts in the 
development of the functional code. Using AOP, fault 
tolerance can be applied in a second stage, after validating 
the core functionality. 
•  Facilitates the evaluation and comparison of several FT con-
figurations, as the developer may easily select what set of 
application threads will be made fault tolerant and on which 
strategy.  
•  Contributes to product line development, as single or 
redundant systems may be generated by introducing or not 
fault tolerant aspects. 
•  Contributes to code reuse, because the same functional code 
can be applied in other projects with different dependability 
requirements. 
Using this approach we noticed that the base code remains 
oblivious to the fault tolerant concern, but on the other hand, the 
aspect code is very dependent on the base code it applies to. This 
fact is related to the nature of fault tolerance domain, where for 
each FT instantiation we may need to define deadlines, extra fault 
detection, alternative procedures, checkpoints, state coordination, 
voting specifications, and so on. For that reason, concrete aspects 
are normally heterogeneous and can target only one application 
thread. However, depending on the characteristics of the 
application process and the selected fault tolerant strategy, less 
application specific code may be needed. In our opinion, 
completely transparent fault tolerance injection is very hard to 
achieve. 
7. RELATED WORK 
The work in [7] proposed the use of aspect-orientation in real-
time systems for distribution, timeliness and dependability do-
mains. An example of the application for each domain is given, 
using CORBA in a logging application as test case. This work 
does not address any fault tolerance mechanism other than 
execution time surveillance. 
Herrero et al [8] designed a replication model called JReplica, 
based on AO techniques, to allow the specification of fault 
tolerance behavior and requirements. This model works at design 
time, using UML. Only passive replication is supported. The 
model includes new entities to intercept input and output 
messages and interact with replication aspects.  
In [9] the authors feel that it is hard and potentially dangerous to 
separate concurrency control and failure management from the 
main application. They prepared a case study based in 
transactions and conclude that homogeneous aspects yields poor 
performance and the functional code keeps semantically coupled 
with the non-functional part (the aspect). Besides, any 
maintenance in one should trigger a modification on the other. 
The work with more similarity with ours is described in [2]. They 
address the question of whether AOP can provide a base for 
implementing fault tolerant mechanisms in non-distributed 
environments. For the implementation of the recovery cache 
mechanism, AspectC++ had to be extended with the “set” 
joinpoint [3]. This work presents examples of aspects for single 
node computing, as time-redundant execution, assertions and 
Recovery Blocks. However, the FT mechanisms are applied at the 
method level while ours is applied at the thread level.  
Detailed quantification of AspectC++ run-time and memory costs 
have been presented in [12]. In this work, extra cycles and 
memory consumption are measured for each aspect-oriented 
feature and also for a refactored and extended AOP version of the 
ECOS operating system kernel. In contrast, our work measures 
the AOP performance in a demanding fault-tolerant application, 
based on CPU utilization 
8. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we described and evaluated an approach for the 
application of AOP to the development of real-time embedded 
fault-tolerant software. Our work differs from previous works for 
injecting fault tolerance at the application thread level, and 
considering several fault tolerant mechanisms and redundant 
hardware/software configurations. 
We conclude that AOP is very useful in this domain because it 
reduces efforts and errors in making a legacy system fault-
tolerant, simplifies system development by allowing the 
validation of the functional part in advance, facilitates the 
evaluation and comparison of various FT configurations, and 
contributes to product line development and code reuse.  
Future work will include the application of AOP for operating 
system fault tolerance and additional run-time overhead 
measurements in cycles or time. 
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